ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose a new technique to distinguish the reason for program failure between hardware malfunctions and program bugs, which mitigates the impact of shorter mean time between failures to the debugging process on the future exa-scale supercomputers and improves the productivity of debugging large-scale parallel programs. Our technique detects program failures by observing the abnormal message passing behaviors with distributed monitors and leverages event-driven mechanism to trigger global status checking among different node groups concurrently. Besides, both coarse-grained execution snapshots and fine-grained failure events can be provided for further failure diagnosis and bug analysis. We implement this technique as a user-space library named failure cause resolver (FCR). Experimental results on the Tianhe-2 supercomputer demonstrate that the latency of FCR for failure detection is acceptable with negligible overhead. In addition, FCR does not require administrative privilege and can be easily integrated into existing large-scale parallel programs.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advancement of high performance computing (HPC) towards exa-scale, the HPC system becomes extremely complicated and usually consists of tens of thousands of nodes. Notably, the mean time between failures (MTBF) of future HPC system deteriorates dramatically to even a few hours due to the ever-increasing system scale [1] . In the meanwhile, debugging the large-scale HPC programs not only requires traditional debugging tools such as GDB but also needs test runs on the real HPC system. Unfortunately, most HPC applications are long running, causing that their test-runs generally last for several hours or even several days, which implies highly possible hardware malfunctions during a test run. What is worse, if the program fails during the test runs, it is difficult for the developers to distinguish whether the failure is due to programming bugs or hardware malfunctions. The reason is that the system status is generally maintained in monitoring or management systems and not exposed to the user programs in nowadays HPC systems due to security concerns. However, to improve the productivity of debugging process, the developers have to know whether the program failure is caused by program bugs or hardware malfunctions in the first place.
Primarily existing research works on debugging HPC programs focus on providing tools to identify program bugs, without considering the impact of decreasing MTBF to the debugging process for large-scale HPC systems. On the other hand, some research targets the fault tolerance issues for large-scale programs running on HPC systems. One of the most commonly adopted techniques is checkpointing which saves the status of the system and program periodically and restores the execution of the program from the last checkpoint in case of hardware malfunctions. However, fault tolerance techniques such as checkpointing are not designed for the debugging purpose, which is oblivious to the reasons for program failures. Therefore, the developers cannot rely on the fault tolerance techniques for the debugging purpose. Besides, system states are usually not exposed to debugging tools or fault tolerance techniques, which makes existing approaches less effective during the debugging process. On the contrary, the big data community commonly uses the techniques such as heartbeat message to maintain the membership information of the system, which provides both program behaviors and machine states for debugging purpose. However, those techniques usually result in substantial performance overhead and poor scalability, which is unacceptable for HPC programs.
Debugging large-scale parallel programs on HPC platforms is quite difficult from the perspective of ordinary users because they have to go through another indirection of batch scheduling system before their program starts to run. What users can do is submitting their programs and then waiting for the execution results. Although some debugging tools can collect and provide program states to users, most of them cannot provide the hardware status of each computing node participating in the program execution. Some underlying infrastructures or system tools that administrators can use to get the hardware status of all computing nodes are not open to the ordinary users due to security concerns. The job scheduler might record some error about reliability, availability and servility (RAS) events, but such information is still incomprehensible from the perspective of ordinary users. Besides, it is ineffective to obtain the computing nodes status by performing the related query command frequently if users cannot make sure a failure happens. Furthermore, what users concern is the part of computing nodes participate in the targeted execution rather than the whole system.
In this paper, we propose a new diagnosing technique to distinguish program failures caused by hardware malfunctions or program bugs to facilitate the debugging of largescale parallel applications in current peta-scale and future exa-scale HPC systems. Moreover, we implement the technique as a user-space library named as failure cause resolver (FCR) that does not rely on the administrative privilege to access the entire system status. Therefore, it is easy to integrate our FCR into user programs and submit them as ordinary jobs, that is, our FCR runs in user-space and is transparent to the HPC management system. FCR leverages a distributed monitoring method to discover program failures through abnormal message passing behaviors automatically and then combines with an event-driven mechanism that can not only trigger the procedure of status checking but also provide an interface to record snapshots about error-related processes at the failure point. Additionally, we adopt a special grouping algorithm in FCR to enable simultaneous status checking among different groups, for improving efficiency and avoiding overload on a particular node. Finally, with the information collected during the execution of the program, developers can easily distinguish the cause of program failure between hardware malfunctions and program bugs, which can effectively improve the productivity of debugging process on large-scale HPC system. Specifically, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work taking into account the impact of decreasing MTBF in the debugging process of HPC programs and proposing a new diagnosing technique that enables programmers to distinguish failure causes between hardware malfunctions and program bugs.
• We propose a distributed monitoring method combined with an event-driven mechanism to identify abnormal message passing behaviors and automatically diagnose program failures. Besides, we propose a grouping status checking algorithm to reduce the overhead of our diagnosing technique effectively.
• We implement the proposed technique as a user-space library which is not only easy to deploy but also lightweight, since it incurs negligible performance overhead and exhibits good scalability on large-scale systems. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the methodology of our approach. Section III describes the implementation of FCR and presents the library interface. Section IV presents our evaluations with three standard MPI benchmarks including HPL, HPCG, and HPCC on Tianhe-2. Section V covers related work and section VI concludes this paper.
II. FCR METHODOLOGY
The workflow of our FCR methodology is shown in Figure 1 . Each block represents a functional module; gray blocks means they need to be performed on all distributed nodes that participate in computing, while white blocks mean they VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 2. System overview of FCR implementation.
are performed on nodes users can access, and dashed block indicates that it is executed on a central node. The steps from 1 to 4 are executed online, with the collaboration of central controller and distributed monitors to identify program failures and perform status checking. The step 5 and step 6 are performed offline by programmers to diagnose the failure cause and identify the software bugs.
Logically, our FCR methodology can be divided into two parts, including failure detection and status checking. These two parts collaborate through an event-driven mechanism. Our methodology first discovers program failures during runtime and then obtains the necessary status information of hardware resources and process states associated with failures. The key to achieving failure detection in application level is to identify abnormal behaviors with little overhead during program execution. The detection overhead is critical to the scalability due to the number of computing nodes and processes in future exa-scale systems. Considering that there are frequent message passing operations during execution of MPI applications, we treat these messages as ''heartbeat'' messages, so it is a suspicious failure if there is no message passing operation in a specific process for a considerable amount of time. We leverage the above observation to identify the potential failures during program execution. Additionally, due to the flexibility of the event-driven mechanism, our methodology supports both coarse-grained analyses with process snapshots and fine-grained analysis with events detail. Figure 2 shows the system overview of our FCR implementation, which is comprised of a central controller and many distributed monitors spawn along with the initialization of HPC program. The monitor observes the abnormal message passing behaviors on each node participating in the current execution and sends a notification message to the central controller to trigger a status checking in the case of suspicious failure, i.e., there is no MPI communication on this node for a specified period. One advantage of our design is that there is no communication between the central controller and the monitor in a failure-free execution where the data transmission generated by FCR only happens between local monitor and processes inside each node.
Moreover, we propose a grouping algorithm which allows the status checking to be performed concurrently among different groups. Firstly, all computing nodes participating in program execution are divided into fixed-size groups. Then the central controller specifies a leader for each group to take charge of status checking inside each group and report the results back. To be robust, if the central controller has not received status checking results from a certain group for a long time and the current leader for that group is invalidated, it reassigns a new leader to re-execute status checking for that group. At last, the central controller gathers all the results and generates a status log associated with the program failure.
In summary, our FCR methodology can detect failures in three categories that are hard to identify with existing approaches. First, program bugs within a certain process that can be detected by the corresponding local monitor. Second, for processes with data dependency, the phenomenon of error propagation can be detected based on the abnormal behaviors of the processes. Third, in the case of node failure due to hardware malfunctions, FCR also can detect this failure by observing the abnormal behaviors of other processes which have a dependency on the malfunction node.
A. IDENTIFY PROGRAM FAILURE
Detecting the failures of HPC applications running at largescale is the first step to solve the software bugs effectively. Moreover, the ability to preserve the failure context with different degrees of details is also critical to further failure diagnosis and bug fixing. Different from the traditional monitor tools, our design is aiming at individual target program execution, focusing on discovering program failure during its execution period and obtaining hardware status at the execution failure point to support causes diagnosis.
1) MONITOR PROGRAM BEHAVIOR
Our method employs a distributed watching mechanism to monitor the state of tens of thousands MPI processes which belong to the current targeting program execution. This method spawns a daemon for each computing node at the initialization stage of MPI programs to listen to various types of messages transmitted intra-node and inter-nodes, besides, check the running states of local worker processes when it finds some suspicious failure events. The executable of the monitor is independent of the program source code, and it must be guaranteed that there is only one monitor instance in one computing node. For a certain process, if there is no communication action with other processes for a long time, it can be considered as a suspicious failure. Therefore, message passing existing in program execution is a natural indicator to reveal the occurrence of program failures. The monitor sets a timer with a fixed interval for periodically performing state checking and maintains two lists of state flags for local worker processes, keeping the state flags of the local process in the previous and the current time steps separately. As illustrated in Figure 3 , associated with the invoking of message passing operation, no matter it is a point-to-point or collective communication, a notification is sent to the monitor to update the corresponding state flag, which indicates the corresponding process is in progress. This data transmission from the local worker processes to the monitor is implemented in a non-blocking mode for reducing the impact to program execution.
The monitor compares every element between the old and the new flag list at the end of the timing cycle and finds out if there are some processes whose state flag is not updated. If it is the case, the corresponding process has potential failures. Because of the data dependence existing between different processes, the occurrence of program bugs or hardware malfunctions like nodes dead prevents the relevant processes from normal execution. In other words, our method can detect program failures as long as they caused abnormal message passing behaviors. However, if the code segment performs a computing-intensive operation and the interval between communications exceeds the threshold of the timer, it will result in a false positive failure event. To deal with this situation, we repeatedly validate the abnormal phenomenon to ensure it is a failure rather than a computing-intensive code segment for reducing false positives.
Furthermore, our method allows programmers to declare customized types of fault events or leverage the existing MPI error handling mechanism to find the occurrence of program failures. For the customized event processing, the user can invoke a designated interface provided by FCR once the specified fault event occurs to trigger the procedure of status checking. The MPI implementation has its own error handling mechanism which can reveal the error description but not the status information of hardware resource. Fortunately, the designated interface can be inserted into the callback functions of MPI for handling errors to trigger the status checking. In summary, our method is based on but not limited to the observation of abnormal communications. With such arrangement, the effectiveness of failure detection can be improved.
As shown in Figure 3 , the communications between the monitor and the worker processes of the target program are very concise, which are implemented in an asynchronous mode. Along with the execution of message passing operation inside the application, a request of updating for state flags is transmitted to the local monitor and returns immediately. Benefiting from this design, our methodology introduces small influence to program performance, which is illustrated by experiments. Besides, a fault occurring in one process can spread to other processes through the cascade propagation due to the data dependence among processes, which provides an opportunity to ensure the success of failure detection when some computing nodes are already dead. Also, there is no communication between the monitors and the central controller in failure-free execution, which is vital for good scalability of our methodology.
Observing the communication behavior during the targeted execution is used by FCR to find the suspicious program failure. Moreover, the abnormal behavior can also be an execution of one debugging segment representing the occurrence of MPI object errors. Therefore, users can define their customized abnormal events or combine the existing MPI object error handling mechanism with FCR. The interaction between the local monitor and the MPI processes is to update the corresponding flag during message passing, which is lightweight and non-blocking.
2) SNAPSHOT OF PROCESS STATUS
As mentioned above, the two modules of failure detection and status checking are connected by the event-driven mechanism. The event-driven mechanism depends on the periodic inspection of the process states achieved by callback function of the timer. Once a fault event (e.g., abnormal termination, communications timeout, MPI object errors) occurs, the monitor sends out a particular type of message for alarming. The time when the events trigger is an appropriate point to record the progress state of program execution. The process of snapshot generation is conducted by the corresponding monitor for the suspected worker process. Specifically, the memory of the targeted process is core dumped and saved in the shared storage.
To provide coarse-grain information regarding the program failure, we preserve the execution context when a failure occurs by taking a snapshot of the target program and saving the snapshot to storage for further analysis. However, considering the substantial overhead and storage cost, it is unwise to save the snapshots of all processes belonging to the target program. Besides, what the programmers concern most is the execution status of the processes related to the failure. Therefore, it is more cost-effective to save only the snapshots of the processes in which a failure occurs. This preservation can be done naturally in our FCR system. The occurrence of failure events are captured by the local monitor using the eventdriven mechanism, and the procedure of snapshot recording only is triggered in those processes where the failure occurs. This partial recording dramatically reduces overhead and storage space required. The implementation of snapshotrecording is not limited to a specific checkpoint or core dump technology. Different approaches can be adopted according to the system environment. We define a descriptor for the snapshot as a tuple consisting of hostname, program name, process ID, and timestamp for the convenience of looking up at the phase of post analysis.
3) RECORDING FAILURE EVENT
To provide the fine-grained information regarding the program failure, we record the failure events with the help of local monitor. In coordinating with the execution of message passing actions inside the application program, the local monitor is informed to update their corresponding state flags. The position information of the message passing including file name, function name and line number can be maintained. During the local inspection of the progress state, the monitor firstly finds out which process encounters a fault event, then extracts the identification of that process as well as the position information aforementioned, packages them into an alarm notification, and then sends it to the central controller immediately. The central controller records all alarm notifications into the event log whose entry is organized in the following format < ProgName − NodeName − ProcID − FileName − FuncName − LineNum − DespString >. The last field DespString is used for distinguishing the fault events triggered by different abnormal behaviors, either occurrence of a user-defined fault event (for example a specific assertion), or an MPI object error (access violation on files, windows or handlers). The programmer can narrow the problem space by manual effort given the content of this event log. Because this log is a guidepost to the corresponding snapshots, the programmer can quickly obtain the execution context close to the failure point and carry out more in-depth analysis.
B. STATUS CHECKING
To avoid the potential bottleneck in the central monitor and mitigate overhead of status checking under the condition of a massive number of nodes and processes, a grouping algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed with a hierarchical structure composed of a unique center used for controlling the workflow of status checking and many sub-centers used for checking respective sub-regions. A monitor represents the corresponding computing node where it is residing on. It is running as a daemon service on the node. Monitors are classified into three categories according to their roles during status checking, including the central controller, the group leader, and the group member. Generally, the process of status checking requires coordination among monitors. It works in the SPMD mode, which means although all the monitors have the same executable, the workflow carried out by monitors might be different. A message in this section refers to the one generated and transmitted inside FCR rather than the one generated by the application.
The algorithm 1 above implements the workflow of status checking on the central controller. It is necessary to know all computing nodes involved in the single target program execution, the topology of grouping, and the types of messages predefined in FCR before starting the checking. There are three input parameters: MSG_IN represents the messages coming from other nodes; NODEGROUP is the data structure used for keeping the identification information of all computing nodes (e.g., address or hostname) and the topology of groups; EXECINFO represents the set of message types.
When the central controller receives a notification message, it recognizes the type of the message (line 1). If this message is an alarm of program failure and status checking is not being performed at that moment, the central controller sets a switch flag immediately to guarantee that there is only one instance of status checking within the same period for an individual program (line 4). Then the central controller assigns a leader for each group, sends a notification message with type = AUTHORIZE to each group leader (lines 5 -8), and creates a designated thread which invokes the function 27: end if 28: end if 29: end for 30: if (receivedCount == EXECINFO.groupNums) then 31: EXECINFO.detecting ← OFF 32: end if 33 : end while check_GD_Complete() for periodical checking of the completion of status checking (line 9). This thread keeps alive until all checking results are collected.
When the central controller receives a checking result message with type = GROUP_DRESULT from a group leader, it marks the corresponding group as received (lines 13 -17). In the iteration of check_GD_Complete(), the central controller checks whether every group has finished its status checking task and sent the results back to the central node (line 21). If the central controller cannot receive the status of a specific group, it will validate if the group leader is alive. It keeps waiting for the checking result if the group leader is still alive; otherwise, the central controller assigns a new leader for that group and re-executes status checking in that group (lines 23 -28) . This mechanism can achieve a certain level of fault-tolerance to guarantee the success of the workflow execution even when some group leaders are dead because of hardware failures during the status checking period. In an extreme case, if all nodes in one group crash down, the central controller marks them as dead in status log. 
Algorithm 2 The Status
SendToGroupLeader(MSG_RESPONSE, NODE_DRESULT ) 8: end if Algorithm 2 outlines the status checking of the local monitor on a specific computing node. Every local monitor initiates a specific thread for listening notification messages which can be distinguished by type token. If the monitor receives a message with type = AUTHORIZE, it means the computing node where the monitor resides is designated as the leader of the group, and takes the responsibility of status checking in that group (lines 2 -4). Once taking the role, the group leader sends a detection request with type = DETECTREQUEST to every member node in the group and waits for an answer. When a member node receives the request of detection, it encapsulates the states of local hardware resources and worker-processes into a message and then responses to the group leader by sending the message (lines 5 -8) . When the answer from a specific node does not arrive within a predefined time period (timeout) or a message containing an error state arrives, the group leader marks the status of that node as dead. Finally, when the group leader receives the status of all member nodes, it sends the results back to the central controller.
The grouping algorithm is similar to Kubernetes [2] in the aspects of overall design. Both of them have a central controller and many distributed services. However, they are developed for the different purposes. Our algorithm is designed for executions during debugging stage. It invokes the hardware status checking only when it has been informed suspicious events occurred. Besides, it collects the hardware status of the computing nodes that participating in the targeted execution rather than the entire system, and exposes this information to the user space programs to facilitate VOLUME 6, 2018 the debugging. The overhead of status checking inside each group is negligible, and there is no interference between different groups. Therefore, users can easily apply FCR to cluster at large scale with nodes organized into groups.
C. USAGE OF FCR
Our FCR approach enriches the toolsets for debugging HPC programs on large-scale computers. One unique usage of FCR is to assist the programmer in distinguishing program failures caused by either program bugs or hardware malfunction. Since our approach automatically discovers program failures by detecting abnormal status using distributed monitors, we can record both the snapshots of the execution context and the detailed failure events information. The status information is valuable for programmers to identify the cause of the failure quickly. By excluding the failures caused by hardware malfunctions, the programmer can more accurately locate the failures due to software bugs. Besides, the event log generated by our approach maps the location where the failure occurs to the program source code, which effectively improves the productivity of debugging.
III. FCR LIBRARY
FCR is open source code now and you can access it through the following address [3] . The design goal of FCR is to facilitate the debugging without any system changes or administrative privilege. Implementing inside MPI requires new software deployment, which prevents its practical adoption on existing clusters and supercomputers; thus we choose to implement FCR as a user-space library. FCR has an independent executable, and when the job scheduler launches the MPI program, the distributed services of FCR are spawned from the MPI program with processes dynamic management by invoking the above executable. FCR does not change the global communicator constructed by the original MPI processes, so it has very few influences on the execution. FCR will exit accompany with the program when it terminates normally. But if a failure occurred during execution, FCR could complete the necessary states checking (e.g., nodes dead or alive, processes terminated or not) and then invoke the operation of abort.
FCR library is written in C language and contains four application interfaces, FCR_Init(), FCR_Knock(), FCR_Trigger() and FCR_Finalize() illustrated in Table 1 . Besides, an executable DaemonService is also executed on each node, serving as the local monitor. Considering the status checking module needs to know exactly where the failure occurs, the central controller collects the identification information of all computing nodes participating in the target program execution at the initialization stage. This job is completed by invoking FCR_Init(). In particular, FCR_Trigger() is exposed to users to support both user-defined failure detection and MPI failure detection to improve the flexibility and effectiveness of FCR solution. For example, it can be invoked in the callback function of the MPI implementation to reveal an occurrence of MPI objects error. The detail of its parameters is listed in Table 2 . Figure 4 gives an example of using our library in the HPL benchmark. Compared to the vanilla MPI program, FCR_Init() inserted after MPI_Init() gathers all worker node IDs and send them to the central controller. After that, it starts the DaemonService as the monitor on each node. To guarantee there is only one instance of the monitor on each node, all worker processes running on the same node constitute a local group and vote a leader to spawn this daemon. Moreover, a local communicator is generated for messages passing between worker processes and the local monitor. The message types are predefined in FCR such as ALARM, AUTHORIZE and GROUP_DRESULT. Monitors on distributed worker nodes cooperate with each other by various types of messages to complete the management and control of the complex workflow. HPL_Send() and HPL_Recv() wrap around the MPI communication functions existing in the source code of HPL. FCR_Knock() is inserted in HPL_Send() and HPL_Recv() to bind ''heartbeat'' with message passing. FCR_Knock() is invoked right after the message passing operations ( MPI_Send()/MPI_Recv()). It sends a notification message to inform the local monitor to update the corresponding state flags. FCR_Trigger() allows users to define customized failure events and associates the failure events with callback functions of MPI objects (e.g., windows, communicators, files) by taking advantage of the MPI error handling mechanism. Finally, FCR_Finalize() is invoked before MPI_Finalize() to inform its corresponding monitor that the task belongs to this worker process is finished. Each monitor maintains a counter for recording the termination of local processes. When all local processes have terminated normally, the monitor terminates the loop of the daemon service and release all occupied resources.
IV. EVALUATION A. EXPERIMENT SETUP
Our experiments are performed on the Tianhe-2 supercomputer [4] which consists of 17,920 computing nodes. Each node contains two 24-core Intel Xeon E5 processors and 64GB memory. The number of computing nodes used in our experiments ranges from 4 to 256. The group size is configurable and preset to 8 by default. HPL [5] , HPCG [6] , and HPCC [7] are three of the most classic benchmarks used for measuring the performance of large-scale HPC systems. Their computational and data access patterns are representative of real world scientific applications. The detailed analysis of their characteristics can be found in [5] - [7] . Therefore, we use these benchmarks in our experiments. Both effectiveness and performance of our approach are evaluated.
B. EFFECTIVENESS OF FAILURE DETECTION
To emulate hardware malfunction, we randomly select a node and suspend all processes related to the target program including both MPI process and the daemon service on that node. To simulate software bugs, we manually insert a program bug (e.g., endless loop, special debugging code or MPI object errors) to a random location of the program source code. All experiments are conducted on a 256-node partition. In practice, if network failure happens, multiple nodes will be detected as dead by FCR, which can be confirmed with human efforts.
After the program terminates, we obtain the hardware status report of this execution, including the log file of the suspicious events and the snapshot of the process that triggers the failure alarm. First, we examine whether there are dead nodes at the failure point in the status report. If a computing node suffers a severe failure such as restart, halt or crash, FCR detects and marks it as dead. In our evaluation, we inject synthetic failure randomly, and the actual location where the failure happens can be detected by FCR with the help of status report. If all nodes are alive, we check the event log to find out which process terminates abnormally, and which process exhibits abnormal communication behavior. We inject an process with endless-loop randomly during evaluation, FCR is able to detect this abnormal behavior is caused by software bug other than hardware malfunction with the help of status report. Additionally, some software bugs may cause the processes running without communication for a long time. By analyzing event log and the corresponding snapshot, FCR is able to locate the source code causing the bug. However, due to the cascade propagation of errors, FCR cannot guarantee to find the exact location leading to the execution failure, which requires further investigation by users.
To verify the effectiveness of FCR in discovering program failures, we define the detection latency as the delay from the time a failure occurs to the time the failure cause is identified. Theoretically, detection latency is composed of two parts as shown in Equation 1. The first part is discovering time measuring the delay from the occurrence of a program failure to the time the failure is captured by the local monitor. The second part is handling time refers to the delay from local sensing of the failure to the time when all diagnosis information have been collected successfully.
T Latency = T Discovering + T Handling
(1) Figure 5 presents the detection latency for finding a program failure caused by a single node hardware malfunction under different timer intervals. The timer interval (T Timer ) is set by the user before running the program, based on which each monitor checks the execution state of all local processes periodically. The detection latency for the case of software bugs shows a similar trend. As shown in Figure 5 , with timer interval changing from 0 to 600 seconds, the detection latency exhibits a linear growth along with the increasing of timer interval, indicating that the timer interval plays an important role in failure detection. However, there is a decrease of detection latency for HPCC when the timer interval changes from 360 to 480 seconds. This decrease is owing to that the detection latency is strongly related to the timing of failure VOLUME 6, 2018 occurrence and the execution state of the program. Examining the cases of setting the timer interval to 360 and 480 seconds respectively when executing HPCC, we find that in the former case the failure happened just after the state flag of the target process was updated. Therefore, the process was considered to be normal in the current timer interval, and failure detection was delayed to the end of the next timer interval. Whereas for the latter case, there was no message passing operation performed in the same period when the failure occurred. Thus, the failure was detected immediately during the current timer interval. The similar situation can be found to explain the decrease of detection latency in HPCG execution when the timer interval changes from 480 to 600 seconds.
For a process under observation, if there is no message passing operation performed within the timer interval when a failure occurs, the failure is to be detected at the end of the timer interval when the local monitor performs state inspection. T Discovering depends on the length of time between failure occurrence and the end of the timer interval. The relation is shown in Equation (2).
However, if at least one message passing operation happens within the timer interval when failure occurs, the identification of the failure is to be delayed to the next round of detection, resulting in additional waiting time. As shown in Equation (3), T Discovering ranges from 1× to 2× of the timer interval.
When taking into account the handling time, the upper and lower bound of the detection latency is estimated by Equation (4). The lower bound indicates that the failure is detected immediately, whereas upper bound indicates the detection is delayed for two timer intervals. The handling time represented by T Handling includes three parts, the time used for sending failure alarm, for checking hardware status and for generating the logs. The lower bound of detection latency depends on T Handling which is then determined by the algorithm of status checking that FCR adopts.
T Handling < T Latency < T Handling + 2T Timer (4) In order to understand which part of Equation (1) is the dominate factor for detection latency, we perform more experiments to evaluate the variation of the handling time with the increasing number of computing nodes. We run each benchmark five times and report the average time under different node scales. As shown in Figure 6 , T Handling changes slightly across all benchmarks as the number of computing nodes increases. For instance, T Handling for HPL is 12 seconds maximum when using 5 nodes, and 10 seconds minimum when using 16 nodes, which is quite stable as the number of nodes scales. This is due to the FCR grouping algorithm for status checking, which can be performed concurrently among multiple groups as the number of nodes increases. It is also obvious that the handling time is quite stable across different benchmarks in Figure 6 . This means that the application behavior has little impact on the performance of status checking. Based on Equation (1) and the experiment results in Figure 5 we can infer that the timer interval makes a more significant contribution to detection latency compared with handling time. Therefore, a small timer interval is preferred for reducing detection latency. However as shown in Figure 5 , the shadow region implies that the false positive results start to appear, if the timer interval is set too small. For the trade-off between detection latency and false positive rate, the programmer needs to choose an appropriate timer interval. Based on an empirical study, we set the timer interval to 1 minute, and find that the detection latency is within from a few seconds to a few minutes, which is acceptable for debugging HPC programs in our evaluation. This is a tradeoff between resource utilization and failure detection accuracy. If the users set a smaller timer, the false positive detection will increase. Then, the users need more efforts to confirm whether the suspicious behavior is caused by a true failure or time-consuming operations. To achieve that, FCR sets a counter (suppose its value is N, which is set to 3 by default but configurable by the user), and if any communication appears in the N continuous time intervals, the suspicious behavior can be attributed to the timeconsuming operations. Otherwise, FCR rings the alarm of failure occurrence. Whether FCR aborts the program depends on the configuration from users. FCR can terminate the execution when detecting a failure, or keep the program running for user intervention.
C. OVERHEAD
We evaluate the overhead of FCR by comparing the benchmark performance running with and without FCR. The number of computing nodes used in our experiments ranges from 4 to 256, with each node running 20 MPI processes. For HPL and HPCC, 80% of the memory is used for calculation, whereas for HPCG we use the default input configuration and preserve enough memory to keep the system work normally.
As shown in Figure 7 , after applying FCR, there is no obvious difference in execution time compared to the original program executions. For HPL in Figure 7 (a), the maximum overhead is 1.15% when running on 128 nodes, whereas the minimum performance overhead is −1.83%when running on 32 nodes. The reason for slightly better performance with FCR is that the network condition, as well as the workload on each node might be different across program runs. For HPCG in Figure 7 (b), the overhead fluctuates from 0.45% on 32 nodes to 4.43% on 64 nodes. For HPCC in Figure 7 (c), the maximum overhead is 3.27% when running on 4 nodes, whereas the minimum overhead is −1.35% when running on 16 nodes.
The results in Figure 7 also reveal the scalability of the three benchmarks. The execution time of HPL declines with the increasing number of nodes and then encounters an inflection point (64 nodes) where the execution time starts to increase. The reason is that as the number of processes increases, each process in HPL gets smaller input due to the invariant size of total input, however the communication overhead among processes starts to dominate. Whereas the execution time of HPCG and HPCC exhibits better scalability. This is because the total input for the above two workloads scales with the number of processes.
The performance variation in Figure 7 is primarily due to the interference among multiple programs running simultaneously on Tianhe-2. Although the computing resources can be preserved for different programs exclusively by the scheduler, they may still compete for network bandwidth and result in an arbitrary delay of message delivery. We verify this by performing the original HPCG for multiple times and observe that the execution time fluctuates between −10% and 10%. In general, the overhead caused by FCR is negligible and does not increase linearly with the increasing number of computing nodes. Two reasons can explain the advantage of FCR in performance and scalability. The first reason is that there is no data communication between the central controller and the remote monitors during a non-failure period. Although there is little communication between the local monitor and the target program processes, it is accomplished in a non-blocking fashion and has little impact on performance. The second reason is that the status checking is only performed upon failure detected, which interferes little to the normal execution. Besides, the communication messages generated by FCR are compact in terms of less messages and smaller size of messages, thus do not consume too much bandwidth. To evaluate the impact of memory usage on the performance of FCR, we run HPL with different problem size as the number of nodes scales. As shown in Figure 8 , the number of processes per node is set to 20, the number of computing nodes ranges from 4 to 128, and the problem size is denoted by N ranging from 40000 to 80000. The range of problem size translates into memory consumption from 20% to 80% during program execution. The overhead caused by FCR is less sensitive to the number of computing nodes, which is quite stable for a given problem size as the number of nodes increases. This phenomenon is consistent with the results in Figure 7 . Meanwhile, experiment results in Figure 8 also show that the overhead changes a little even though the problem size varies significantly. To understand the reason for the stable overhead, we randomly choose two executions in Figure 8 and analyze their execution details. After com- paring the frequency of message passing operations in each process, we find that the two executions are on the same order of magnitude, which is the primary reason for the stable overhead.
To evaluate the impact of computation load to the overhead of FCR, we change the number of processes per node from 4 to 23 in the case of HPL. Additionally, we set the problem size N to consume 80% of the entire memory and the number of computing nodes to 128. As illustrated in Figure 9 (a), the overhead remains stable and fluctuates between −5% and 5%. The additional communication between FCR and the target program does not introduce obvious overhead in program execution, which is because the number of MPI processes to be monitored on each node is constrained to be less than the total number of cores. In order to verify whether the overhead caused by FCR is stable across different node scales, we repeat the same experiments with 4, 8, 16, 32 and 64 computing nodes respectively. The experiment results are shown in Figure 9 (b)∼9(f), which reveals the similar trend of overhead across different node scales. Generally, overhead varies between −3.06% and 5.8% and does not increase linearly with the number of processes per node, which implies that FCR causes insignificant overhead and scales well as the computation load per node increases.
The excellent scalability of FCR can be attributed to using message passing operations inside applications instead of heartbeat messages transmission between nodes. Therefore, there is no additional data transmission among computing nodes, which avoids bandwidth competing with the target program. Based on the observation of abnormal communication behaviors, our failure detection approach can help the programmers to identify hard-to-find program bugs in larger-scale parallel programs, for example, deadlocks, endless loops and abnormal termination caused by external signals.
D. LIMITATIONS
Our approach can automatically detect failures which are reflected as abnormal communication behaviors at the application level, no matter hardware malfunctions or program bugs that cause them. However, certain types of failures cannot be detected by our approach such as silent data corruptions (SDC). SDC is a particular error caused by cosmic rays or particle collisions, which usually impacts the correctness of the computing results. Detecting SDC at the application level is challenging because SDC errors can happen in anywhere and anytime as the program runs. Existing SDC detection methods at application level can be classified into four categories including full replication [8] , algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) [9] , approximate computing [10] and data-analytic-based (DAB) fault tolerance [11] . In the scenario of debugging, we can leverage existing methods to detect SDC and make a tradeoff between overhead and accuracy. For example, running the application with the periodical checkpoint to detect SDC, and restarting from the healthy checkpoint whenever SDC happens. We will investigate this direction in our future work.
V. RELATED WORK
Debugging large-scale parallel program is still a challenging issue even though many methods or tools have been developed for decades. Interactive debugging (e.g., TotalView [12] , DDT [13] ) is a traditional method which allows programmers to control the progress of a specified process set, check variables and verify their results with manual efforts. One disadvantage of such method is that it cannot detect program failures automatically. Besides, when it comes to large-scale, analyzing the data across tens of thousands of processes by human efforts is exhausting. Some debugging tools collect various program states during execution and provide them to programmers for post analysis. For example, STAT [14] gathers and merges stack traces from the processes of a parallel program. With these traces, programmers can produces call graphs which captures the calling context of the processes in the form of a prefix tree. However, STAT might not be an appropriate debugging tool for ordinary users due to three reasons. Firstly, STAT depends on many packages including MRNet [15] , which requires pre-installation by the system administrator and beyond the privilege of ordinary users. Secondly, STAT cannot identify program failures automatically, so it needs the intervention from human experts which is burdensome especially debugging a long-running program. Thirdly, it does not take into account the influence of hardware malfunctions during program debugging and thus cannot distinguish between hardware malfunctions and program bugs when a failure occurs.
MTBF of the parallel computer systems is getting smaller with the increasing system scale. On the contrary, HPC applications usually require long-time execution, which makes the execution suffered from hardware failures even during the debugging stage. Currently, most of the research on HPC program debugging concentrate on specific bugs, for example, some debug-version implementations of MPI are used for capturing bugs inside libraries; some tools are based on programming or statistics rules (e.g., MPI-CHECK [19] , Umpire [20] , and MARMOT [21] ) are used for checking bugs inside the applications. While other tools such as MC-Checker [22] , WuKong [23] , AutomaDeD [24] , and FlowChecker [25] collect relevant information of MPI invocations online and analyze the recorded trace files offline to find software bugs which are difficult to detect. All those methods ignore the influence of hardware malfunctions on large-scale parallel program debugging. In contrast, our approach can automatically identify program failures, and further distinguish the failures between hardware malfunctions and program bugs for better debugging.
Previous research on failure detection concentrates on checking hardware status of the systems. Most of them are based on an all-to-all communication approach that each node periodically sends a heartbeat message to all other nodes. Because considering a fully connected set of known nodes that communicate in an all-to-all manner, those implementations are poor in scalability and are not appropriate for platforms composed of a large number of nodes [26] . Some approaches [27] use gossip-like protocols where nodes randomly choose a few other nodes to exchange their failure information. The method in [28] proposes a scalable failure detector based on observing random nodes and gossiping information, targeting at HPC computations at scale. However, the method brings along redundant failure information which degrades their scalability. The failure detection algorithm in [26] uses a virtual observation ring to minimize the overhead, allowing each node to be observed by another single node. This algorithm was implemented in a resilient MPI distribution. It can provide a global view of all computing nodes status for the purpose of system maintenance. From the perspective of debugging, the users should take into account the status of the hardware participating in the execution. However, traditional HPC environment grants the users with the limited privilege to query the hardware status during execution. This is exactly where our approach helps. With our lightweight and flexible user-space library, the users can easily identify the program failures caused by either hardware malfunctions or program bugs during the debugging stage.
Hierarchical failure detector [29] supports large-scale applications through two level group organization, local group and global group. Local group represents a LAN where each member within the group periodically sends messages to other members to confirm whether crash happened. Global group consists of all the leaders elected by every local group. Although this method can provide liveness information of processes while meeting the requirement of quality of service, it requires the support from underlying architecture and needs to be mapped upon the network topology. In contrast, our method is designed for ordinary users, which means the users can deploy FCR service without additional privilege. Besides, FCR is agnostic to the network topology because the group partition is done in the application level.
Program debugging relying on bug reproduction becomes more and more difficult to achieve, particularly in largescale systems because of the non-determinism issue. Record and replay (RnR) the process of execution is primitive to solve this problem. By recording program input and nondeterministic events in a log during the original program execution, it can accomplish execution replay under the control of replay tools. Some RnR implementations are based on hardware-assist schemes (e.g., Rainbow [30] , Karma [31] , RelaxRelplay [32] ), and some others are software-only solutions (e.g., SCALATRACE [33] , SReplay [34] , Respec [35] ). However, the overhead and the storage space required for recording the entire execution trace will grow dramatically with the increasing of program execution scale.
Checkpoint-based rollback recovery is a key mechanism to accomplish RnR, which can be generally classified into three categories: uncoordinated, coordinated and communication-induced [36] . Program execution can resume from the latest saved checkpoint which has a globally consistent state. Log-based rollback recovery mechanism combines Checkpoint/Restart (CR) technique with the message log to reconstruct the previous state beyond the latest checkpoint and can be further classified into three categories: pessimistic, optimistic, and casual message logging. Those methods use checkpointing to recover the process, then use message log to achieve the replay of associated nondeterministic events. Both aforementioned rollback-recovery mechanisms rely on the implementation of CR which can be classified further into three categories: system-level implementation (e.g., BLCR [37] ), user-level implementation (e.g., Condo [38] , Dejavu [39] , and DMTCP [40] ), and application level implementation (e.g., C3 [41] , FTI [42] ). The CR tools implemented in the system-level often require modification of the kernel source code. The CR tools implemented in the user-level are usually not transparent to the users because applications are modified, recompiled and re-linked to the checkpoint library before the checkpoint facility is used. Moreover, they impose limitations on the system calls that the application can make [36] . The CR tools implemented in the application level allow the programmer to inject checkpoint code directly into the application code so that the checkpoint activities can be carried out by the application. However, they require the programmer to have a deep understanding of the applications to be checkpointed. The overhead and storage cost are two limiting factors that the users concern the most when performing checkpoint on large-scale systems.
Transient errors (soft errors) are one of the primary hardware causes of today's HPC systems failures. If they occur in the memory where the operating system resides on, the system is highly possible to crash. If they corrupt the data segments used by applications, the execution might be terminated abnormally or generate incorrect results. The main memory uses ECC to detect and correct soft errors, but this mechanism cannot be applied in other components (e.g., processors and registers) because it is expensive. However, ECC cannot help in correcting multiple-bit-errors. Bolt leverages runtime checking to detect the soft error and proposes a compiler-directed soft recovery scheme that provides finegrained and guaranteed recovery without excessive performance and hardware overhead [43] . RedMPI focuses on detection and correction of silent data corruption within the MPI applications. It assumes a model wherein corruption in application data manifests itself by producing different MPI messages between replicas [8] . RedMPI can detect the divergent messages between replicas when it runs in double redundant mode, and correct faulty messages through voting when it runs in triple redundant mode. For verification, all the replicas need to send a message to communicate with each other and verify their content, and RedMPI's protocols use receiver-side verification for reducing message latency. Also, RedMPI adopts an efficient protocol namely MsgPlushHash to replace messages with the hash for verification, which results in a considerable reduction of bandwidth requirement.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a new method to distinguish program failures caused by hardware malfunctions or software bugs, which improves the productivity of debugging HPC programs, especially those targeted at the future exa-scale computers. Our approach detects program failures in the HPC environment by observing abnormal message passing behaviors using distributed monitors. Once the program failure is detected, an event-driven mechanism is leveraged to perform status checking that can record both the execution snapshots and detailed events related to the failure. Moreover, a grouping algorithm is proposed to avoid the potential bottleneck at the central monitor and reduce the overhead of status checking. Our method is implemented as a user-space library that does not require system level privilege and is easy to be integrated with HPC programs. The experiments on the Tianhe-2 supercomputer show that our approach can effectively identify hardware malfunctions with acceptable detection latency. Besides, the overhead introduced by our approach is negligible and does not increase linearly with the scaling-up of the system and the program execution.
It is noteworthy that abnormalities might manifest in multiple positions due to error propagation. According to the cascade propagation phenomenon, the programmer should investigate event records in chronological order since the earlier event is closer to the root source of the fault. However, it cannot be guaranteed that the fault event closest to the root source will always appear in the top records due to system latency. Using probabilistic progress-dependence inference to identify the least-progressed task is a feasible way to help the programmer to locate the root source, which can narrow the problem space from millions to one or several processes. We will continue to work on this issue in our future work. 
